online news; Hossamuddin Ashna wrote in a note: Marco Rubio’s recent words about Iran should not be seen as merely a set of diplomatic slurs or a misrepresentation of history. What can be seen in his October 7 speech in Athens and in interviews and news meetings in recent weeks, is an attempt to formulate a strategic narrative of a situation based on strategic culture; A narrative in which the historical past, the western civilizational identity, the definition of threat and the legitimacy of the use of power are tied together.
1. Framework: strategic culture and strategic narrative
Snyder (1977) considered strategic culture as a set of common ideas and behavior patterns of the security elite. Gray (1981) linked it to the historical experience and “self-concept” of a society, and Johnston (1995) called it a system of symbols, that is, analogies, metaphors, and language, that make strategic preferences stable. The second generation (Booth, Klein) had a different view: culture can be a discursive tool of elites for legitimization. The criticisms are also serious: Dash (1998) talked about the danger of distance reasoning and Bloomfield (2012) about the stagnation of culture.
A distinction is necessary among these. Strategic culture is a relatively stable set of assumptions; Strategic narrative is a way that a political activist presents to different audiences to express his identity, describe threats and justify his choices. Rubio’s speech should be read twice: once as a sign of symbolic reserve, and once as a legitimizing act.
2. What exactly does the speech text say?
The full text of the speech has five verses.
1) Beginning with the destruction of Athens. Rubio begins in 480 BC: Xerxes’ army captures Athens and burns the temples; The Athenians return and bury the ruined remains and raise the Parthenon under Pericles.
2) Birth certificate. He draws a line from Athens to Rome, from Rome to European Christendom, and from there to America, enumerating “the main characteristics of the West”: rugged individualism, ambition, adventure, risk, and honor. He considers the concept of “thymos” (fire of passion, courage and pride) to be the heart of great civilization.
3) Crisis. According to him, the West is ashamed of its achievements, has made “nationalism” an ugly word, weakened the industry and the army, and entrusted a part of its sovereignty to global bureaucracies.
4) Program. America under Trump has chosen the “reckless pursuit of national power”: supply chain, reindustrialization, defense restructuring, and technological competition. He also says the Greeks knew that power required not only the means of defense, but also the credibility of the readiness to use it, and that the Trump administration wants to restore this “classical understanding of politics.”
5) Duty and death. Socrates, three hundred Spartans besieged against the Persian armies, and Achilles are the models of the western hero. It is in this section that contemporary Iran comes out clearly: the “extremist mullahs of Iran” with the “culture of death” are facing heroes who are ready to die but do not worship death.
In the first paragraph, “Xerxes’ army” and “Persians” are the invaders, and today Iran is only mentioned in the fifth paragraph.
3. Xerxes in narrative: the past that is reconstructed for the present
Choosing this event to start the speech of the US Secretary of State, in the midst of a military confrontation with Iran, goes beyond reporting an ancient event. Governments don’t just learn from the past; They select and reinterpret the past needed to justify today’s actions from among the possible narratives.
However, caution is required. Rubio does not claim that the enmity between Iran and the West has continued for 25 centuries and does not prove such a direct relationship. But the juxtaposition of the narrative of the Persian attack, the need to restore the power of the West and today’s threats, opens up the possibility of such a reading for the audience. This is “narrative substitution”: the structure of the text insinuates a similarity without making an explicit claim.
Rubio’s account omits several things: the Ionian revolt, the burning of Sardis in 498 BC, and the chain of events that culminated in the campaign. This omission does not invalidate the original event of the destruction of Athens, but it shows that the political narrative highlights parts of the events to construct a specific meaning.
There is a deeper layer. Almost everything we know about the wars between Iran and Greece comes from Greek sources (Herodotus). Studies such as Edith Hall’s “Barbarian Invention” and Francois Hartog’s “Herodotus’ Mirror” show that Greek identity was constructed in opposition to Persia, and Edward Said links this tradition to Orientalism. From this point of view, the speech of Athens is a link in a long chain that makes the “East” tyrannical and the “West” free.
In the end, three levels should be separated: the Achaemenid Empire, Iran as a historical civilization, and the Islamic Republic as a political system. Everyday speech calls all three “Iran” or “Persia”, and because of this, the border between the regime and the nation becomes slippery at the level of perception. The list of Western heroes is completed with Alexander; He who is the destroyer of Persepolis in Iranian memory.
4. From “Iran of the Country” to “Iran of the Revolution”
In order to understand Rubio’s strategic mindset, Athens’ words should be placed alongside his other statements. In the hearing of the Senate on January 15, 2025, he distinguished between the people and civilization of Iran and the government of the Islamic Republic and emphasized that the current rulers do not represent the entire history and culture of Iran. In an interview at the end of September 2026, he said that Iran is a country, but the problem is not the country, it is the revolution. Earlier in June 2026 in Abu Dhabi, there was talk of choosing between “being a country” and “revolutionary movement exporting terrorism”.
This formulation is an important key to understanding his perception of the Islamic Republic. In this framework, America’s problem with Iran is not just a dispute over the nuclear program or a regional dispute; Rubio distinguishes between the logic of the national state and the logic of the transnational revolution, and sees the latter as an obstacle to a stable agreement.
But this duality is critical. Revolutionary governments have security, economic and territorial interests, and non-revolutionary governments may have developmentalist or ideological policies. Studies such as Stephen Walt’s “Revolution and War” show how revolutionary governments become more calculating over time. Iran’s behavior in accepting Resolution 598 and in the negotiations leading to the JCPOA shows that expediency, material limitations and institutional calculations were present in the decisions of the Islamic Republic.
5. “Culture of death” and the logic of deterrence
Another aspect of Rubio’s words is describing the leaders of the Islamic Republic with religious and apocalyptic terms. In an interview with Sean Hannity on September 28, he claimed that the main decision-makers in Iran are radical clerics with an apocalyptic view of the future. In his speech in Athens, he used the word “culture of death” to present a picture of the contrast between Western values ​​and the Iranian government’s understanding of martyrdom. In an October 20 interview with Network 18, he once again emphasized the difficulty of reaching an agreement with the leaders of the Islamic Republic, although he said that his criticism was not aimed at all Shia clerics.
The importance of these words is in the structure of the argument. Bargaining over interests is still conceivable when a competitor with conflicting interests is introduced. But when his behavior is described as the product of irreconcilable beliefs and disregard for the human cost, the range of reliable options in the mind of the audience becomes more limited. This frame can legitimize stronger deterrence and reduce trust in diplomatic commitments.
There is also a subtle analytical point: the speech itself praises death in the line of duty (the Spartans, Christian martyrs, the Alamo). The difference is in the moral coding: “death in the line of duty” versus “death worship”. This distinction draws a symbolic border between “us” and “them” rather than a description of Iran’s reality.
On the contrary, the evidence shows that Iran’s behavior has been a combination of the discourse of martyrdom and resistance and tactical pragmatism. If we think of the adversary as a “death worshiper,” deterrence based on the threat of punishment seems less credible, and an absolute red line (“Iran can’t have nuclear weapons, period, head of the line”) seems more logical. This link is analytical inference, not Rubio’s outright claim.
However, the existence of such descriptions does not prove that American policymakers have abandoned the possibility of negotiation. At an Oct. 31 news conference in Atlanta, Rubio clarified that talks, direct and indirect, have not stopped and that Trump has not yet decided on new strikes. In Athens, he refused to determine the acceptable level of enrichment. So, two paths can be seen at the same time: emphasizing the threat that should not be normalized, and maintaining the possibility of a conditional agreement. This combination can be part of the pressure and negotiation strategy; Its effectiveness can only be clarified by examining the decisions and behavior of the parties.
6. The audience of Rubio’s words is not only Iran
The place and audience of the speech is as important as its content. In Athens, the civilizational narrative can strengthen the bond between America and Europe; There, the Greek foreign minister spoke about the possibility of naval aid in Hormuz, if there is a valid peace process. In an interview with the Indian media, the attack on commercial ships is compared to the submarine warfare of Nazi Germany, and the issue is connected to the safety of sailors and business. In the US domestic media, the nuclear threat is at the center of the argument, and at the G20 meeting, the message is directed at countries suffering from trade and energy disruptions.
In all these cases, Iran is present, but the audience and the language of argument are changed. This difference should be taken seriously: Rubio’s words provide clear evidence about his strategic narrative, but to prove that this narrative expresses the sustainable strategic culture of America, it must be weighed against documents, institutional training, security preferences, and the behavior of different American governments.
7. Strategic culture or the necessity of today’s politics?
The methodological question is: Are Rubio’s words a reflection of a relatively stable culture in American foreign policy, or are they tailored to the political needs of the Trump administration? The answer is not necessarily a choice between the two.
In the literature of American strategic culture, concepts such as exceptionalism, the role of global leadership, technological and military superiority, and the connection of power with a historical mission have been examined many times. Walter Russell Mead identifies four competing traditions in American foreign policy: Hamiltonian (trade and economic order), Wilsonian (universal values), Jeffersonian (prudence), and Jacksonian (national pride and power). In the speech of Athens, the weight of the Hamiltonian (supply chain, industry) and Jacksonian (pride, shame of failure, national power) layers are high, and democracy and equality, which have meaning in the same historical place, are not mentioned much. This rotation can be seen as a sign of the redistribution of the weight of traditions; But this hypothesis relies on a speech and needs more evidence to confirm.
There are competing readings. Supporters consider the speech to be a restoration of civilizational self-confidence and a national goal, and a call for a fair distribution of the defense burden. Critics consider it a selective narrative of history and an excessive emphasis on competition and power. On this basis, it is better to consider Rubio’s narrative as one of the active and controversial formulations of American strategic culture in the current situation: a formulation that both benefits from historical and identity reserves and serves the goals of today’s politics. It cannot be concluded that all American policies are rooted in a single cultural tradition; In America itself, there is a deep disagreement about the meaning of national interests, the limits of intervention and the ratio of power with international rules.
8. Reflection in Iran and the danger of the cycle of representation
Based on the analysis of Iran Dossier, this speech has appeared on the front pages of Iranian newspapers since October 9, from Javan to Sharq, and has provoked reactions from Baqaei, Qalibaf and Velayati. According to the same report, the answers are focused on two points: talking about Valerian and Shapur, and pointing to the contradiction of praising the Spartans’ stand while denigrating the stand of the Iranians. The report claims that the government has moved closer to the pre-Islamic heritage since 2025, and the rhetoric has contributed to this campaign.
If the general picture is correct, it shows that the strategic culture in Iran is not uniform and unchangeable. The narrative of resistance, national interests, economic considerations, the memory of the war, Iranian and Islamic identity, and the necessity of diplomacy have not always reached a conclusion; And external discourse can highlight one of these layers. Analyzing Iran’s behavior without considering institutional differences and changing conditions is as fallible as analyzing American policy from a speech.
Cognitive danger arises when each side equates its cultural image of the other with its full reality. In this situation, the competitor’s action is not interpreted based on new evidence, but with pre-accepted assumptions; Calculating the cost and benefit becomes more difficult and identifying the real change in the other party’s behavior becomes more limited.
summary
Rubio’s recent words are important because they show how history and identity can enter the language of national security and turn a specific conflict into a civilizational issue. But history does not produce strategy by itself, and historical narrative does not replace accurate knowledge of the other side.
The decisive question for Tehran and Washington is whether they can distinguish between what they think about each other’s identity and intentions and what can be seen in actual behavior and decisions. The answer to this question for the future of relations between the two countries is probably more important than which side presents a more convincing narrative of the wars of 25 centuries ago.
Key sources
• Snyder 1977; Gray 1981; Johnston 1995; Desch 1998; Bloomfield 2012
• Mead, WR (2001). Special Providence. Knopf.
Hall, E. (1989). Inventing the Barbarian. Oxford UP; Hartog, F. (1988). The Mirror of Herodotus. U. California Press; Said, E. (1978). Orientalism.
Walt, S. (1996). Revolution and War. Cornell UP.
• The text of the speech on October 7, 2026: the US Ministry of Foreign Affairs; CBS report
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